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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In his seminal work, Global Labour 
Flexibility: Seeking Distributive Justice, Guy 
Standing distinguishes between work, 
labour and employment.  He defines 
work as an activity that encompasses 
“creative, conceptual and analytic 
thinking and use of manual aptitudes”.  
Labour he describes as:  
                                                 
1 Based on the opening lines of Guy Standing’s 
book, Global Labour Flexibility: Seeking 
Distributive Justice (1999), which are a 
paraphrase of Rousseau’s famous line. 
2  I would like to thank the participants of the 
IGLP’s Pro-Seminar on “Transnational Social 
Policy and Labor Regulation: Crisis and Change” 
held at Harvard Law School in June 2011, at 
which I presented an outline of this paper. It was 
helpful to me to locate these arguments within a 
larger discourse on the limitations of labour law 
in addressing distributional issues in the context 
of the global informalisation of work relations. 
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“arduous – perhaps alienated work – and epistemologically it conveys a sense of pain – 
animal laborans.  We may define labour as activity done under some duress, and some 
form of control by others or by institutions or by technology, or more likely by a 
combination of all three. ”3 
Standing argues that the rights of labour are “claims of reciprocity for the reality of 
being labour”, which neither challenge the social conditions that produce the particular 
relations of production, nor the particular form of control exercised over people who 
labour.  All that is conjured up, he argues, is that the employment relationship is 
governed by fairness, a normative concept, which translates into normative rights.4   
To the over 12 million unemployed South Africans,5 even the possibility of labour is 
denied.   And, like their counterparts in other developing countries, those who labour 
informally6 increasingly enjoy limited “claims of reciprocity”. In South Africa, this is 
despite wide-reaching labour and employment laws and the inclusion of justiciable 
labour rights in the Constitution.     
This article is concerned with a particular category of informal workers, namely 
informal craft producers who access formal markets through intermediaries.   
Intermediaries – not-for-profit organisations as well as for-profit enterprises – source 
contracts, design products, negotiate contracts, train informal producers to make the 
products, purchase the raw materials and pay producers for products made.   Most 
producers work on the intermediary’s premises, are paid by the piece and are denied 
benefits and protection.7  An unreflective response invokes the suite of employment 
rights potentially triggered by the rebuttable presumptions contained in section 200A 
of the Labour Relations Act  66 of 1995 (“LRA”).  Producers earning below the stipulated 
minimum8 are likely to be able to invoke at least one of the seven rebuttable 
presumptions that they are employees, which then trigger employee rights and benefits 
                                                 
3 Standing, G Global Labour Flexibility: Seeking Distributive Justice (1999) at 4. 
4 See Santos, A “Three Transnational Discourses of Labor Law in Domestic Reforms” University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Economic Law (2010) for an exposition of the origins of labour law, which he 
argues has its intellectual roots in 18th century social law, as workers’ rights could not be advanced by 
private or public law.   
5
 Using the narrow, official definition of unemployment, the 2005 Labour Force Survey finds that 25.3 per 
cent of South Africans are unemployed. The official definition of unemployment in South Africa is as 
follows: “Persons aged 15-65 years who did not have a job or business in the seven days prior to the 
survey interview but had looked for work or taken steps to start a business in the four weeks prior to the 
interview and were able to take up work within two weeks of the interview.” See Stats SA Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey Quarter 2 (April to June) 2010. 
6 In September 2005 total employment in the informal sector was 2 801 000, representing a 22, 8 per cent 
share of total employment, excluding domestic workers (Development Policy Research Unit, University of 
Cape Town, 2007). 
7 Von Broembsen, M “Mediating from the margins: the role of intermediaries in facilitating participation 
in formal markets by poor producers and users” Paper for TIPS (2011). 
8 The section does not apply to persons earning in excess of an amount determined by the Minister of 
Labour: s 200A(2).  The amount is currently R172 000. – Editor. 
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contained in the LRA, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (“BCEA”) and 
other employment laws.   
But, as this article will argue, establishing and enforcing producers’ rights as 
employees is likely to result in the “employers”, namely the intermediaries, 
restructuring their relationship with producers to fall outside the purview of section 
200A.  Alternatively, intermediaries may close down if they cannot afford the cost of 
providing the benefits and protections prescribed by employment laws.  And, given the 
structural impediments for the vast majority of producers to participate in formal 
markets without intermediaries, either strategy on the part of intermediaries would 
render producers’ livelihoods more precarious.9 
This paper is not animated by a libertarian commitment to free markets and thus is 
not advancing these arguments in support of a “flexible labour regime”.  Rather, the 
article hopes to contribute to a growing recognition of the need for inter-disciplinary 
exchange on unemployment and labour markets. By drawing on a small empirical study 
of informal producers and the intermediaries that facilitate their participation in the 
labour market, it also hopes to offer some thoughts to labour law scholars engaged in 
the task of re-envisioning labour law.    
In the context of craft producers, the article questions the relevance of the 
traditional labour law lens to this context, a lens that seeks to frame the relationship 
between the intermediary and the craft producer as one of employer and employee. The 
craft sector,10 along with the agri-business sector, has low barriers to entry, and is thus 
“one of the few entry points available to South Africans presently excluded from the 
formal economy”. 11 If one discounts outliers, it is argued that marginalised producers 
can only participate if their participation is mediated by intermediaries. The argument 
is for a broader lens than the binary employer/employee or triangular 
firm/broker/worker lens. It is suggested that value chain analysis, which focuses on the 
entire supply chain, better captures the complexity of the relations of work and, more 
importantly, the extent of the power relations at play.   
The article argues further that voluntary codes, state regulation or self-governance 
of supply chains seldom have re-distributional effects and it thus explores the re-
distributional potential of commercial incentives. Specifically, the article explores 
whether the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) framework could 
be used by intermediaries and producers as a re-distributive leverage.   
Currently, firms (in this context, retailers) earn points for facilitating the 
participation of black-owned small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in their 
supply chains. Such participation in the craft sector is predominantly on adverse 
                                                 
9 Von Broembsen (2011) (n 7 above).   
10 See Department of Arts, Science, Culture and Technology “The South African craft industry report” 
(1998) for the different categories that constitute “craft”. 
11 Ibid. 
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terms.12  But, as the article will argue, when a retailer buys a pair of beaded sandals 
from a black community-owned firm, it is not only buying the labour or the sandals; it is 
buying B-BBEE scorecard points.  These points translate into commercial advantages 
for the firm.  Given that, in another commercial context, these B-BBEE points have been 
accorded a commercial value, the article explores whether and how these points could 
be used as leverage to forge an entitlement13 to monetary or other compensation for 
marginalised producers.   
The article is structured as follows: first, the producer/intermediary/retailer 
relationship is situated within the global context (see section 2).  The implications for 
labour of the shift in relations of production over the last 30 years are analysed together 
with the accompanying discourses that challenge the norm of reciprocity.  How labour 
law scholars are framing and responding to the prevalence of non-standard, atypical 
and precarious work both globally and in South Africa, is outlined.  
Next (in section 3), in order to illustrate the potentially adverse implications of the 
regulatory framework (that has sought to extend the notion of “employee” to 
marginalised producers), there is a discussion on intermediaries who facilitate the 
participation of marginalised producers in craft value chains and the concomitant 
limitations of labour law’s analytical lens.    
This is followed (in section 4) by a discussion of value chain analysis (VCA) as an 
alternative conceptual lens to the employment relationship. The article argues that VCA 
better captures the complexity of the relationship between retailers, intermediaries and 
producers and, by focusing on the power of the lead firm (in this case, the retailer) as 
opposed to the responsibilities of the intermediary only, VCA is a lens that holds more 
potential than the employee/employer lens to realise decent work for marginalised 
craft producers.  
The article then (in section 5) argues that in certain political economies, such as 
South Africa, institutions in the form of commercial incentives potentially constitute 
leverages to shift dominant (or lead firm) behaviour.  Specifically (in section 6), the 
article explores whether and how the B-BBEE framework could be used by 
intermediaries as a re-distributive lever to benefit producers..  
2. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
The past thirty years have seen fundamental shifts in global economic realities and 
policies. The liberalisation of economies has led to a substantial shift in the nature and 
form of work relations. Global economic restructuring has led to increasing 
informalisation and insecurity of labour, and poses challenges for the future of labour 
law itself.  So as to more fully understand the constraints under which the 
                                                 
12 Von Broembsen, M (2011) (n 7 above).   
13 Sen’s (1999) distinction between “just” or “moral” entitlements and legal entitlements is helpful, 
particularly since just or moral entitlements often prefigure their realisation as legal entitlements.    
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intermediaries and producers of the article’s focus operate, the global context is 
discussed in more depth below. 
2.1 The new global order and the de-regulation of product and labour 
markets 
The new global economic order has incrementally undermined the reciprocal “fairness” 
framework that historically governed the employer/employee relationship. The “market 
reform agenda”14 of the global financial institutions (GFIs) – specifically the World Bank 
(WB),15 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) – has undermined the collective bargaining power of labour, which is critical to 
undergird the reciprocal agreement, and which thereby creates an enabling 
environment for multi-nationals to deny norms of reciprocity.16 Two aspects of the 
market reform agenda are relevant to this article – the deregulation and/or 
liberalisation of product markets (“non-protectionism”) and the deregulation of labour 
markets (“labour flexibility”).   
Supra-national free-trade agreements facilitated by the WTO have led to a radical 
restructure of global product markets.  Signatories to these agreements have de-
regulated their national product markets, mostly by abolishing measures that protect 
local industries (such as import duties and subsidies) or by adopting a privatisation 
approach.17   This de-regulation or liberalisation of product markets has paved the way 
for a restructuring of the international division of labour by enabling multi-national 
firms (MNFs) to establish global supply chains and production networks18 in de-
regulated developing economies.   
Another key tenet of the GFIs’ reform agenda – a flexible labour regime – provides 
MNFs with an incentive to move production to developing countries which tend to have 
weak or poorly enforced regulation and tend to lack strong labour movements.  
                                                 
14  Rittich, K ”Global labour policy as social policy” Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal (2008). 
15    See The World Bank “Development report 1995: workers in an integrating world” (1995); The World 
Bank “Doing business: understanding regulation” (2004); and The World Bank “Doing business: creating 
jobs” (2006).  
16 Santos (2010) at 145) argues that even the European Court of Human Rights is influenced by the tenets 
of this new order as its decisions have eroded union security rules that enabled “workers to organise and 
bargain collectively”.  
17 Bosch, G, Mayhem, K & Gautie, J “Industrial relations, legal regulations and wage setting” in Gautie J (ed) 
Low wage work in the wealthy world (2010). 
18 Supply chains and production networks represent two different analytical perspectives. Value chain 
analysis follows a product from inception until it is sold. It analyses the linkages between firms with the 
objective of ascertaining who supplies what to whom and the value that  is added at each stage of the 
process. It analyses the power relations between firms in the value chain. Production network analysis 
looks at the relationship of firms to “wider institutional actors”, including other firms in the network and 
the social and institutional context within which the chains operate.  See Barrientos, S “Global production 
systems and decent work” (2007) and Navdi, K “Globalisation and poverty: how can global value chain 
research inform the policy debate?” Institute of Development Studies Bulletin (2004). 
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Standing details different aspects of a flexible labour regime.  First he describes 
“production or organisational flexibility”, which references the global trend of large-
scale enterprises to downsize by outsourcing or subcontracting their non-core functions, 
and by creating production/supply chains in which a series of firms produce different 
components of the product that the dominant enterprise previously produced in-house.  
The dominant or lead firms thus “contract out their employment function”, thereby 
retaining flexibility to respond to variable market demand.  The lead firm thus shifts the 
risk of low demand to firms down its supply chain.   
The second aspect of labour flexibility is “wage system flexibility”.  Labour costs 
comprise wage and “non-wage” costs.  Wage costs include money and benefits (such as 
bonuses, health insurance and pensions) while “non-wage” costs reflect the percentage 
of overheads attributable to each employee.   Arguments for wage system flexibility 
target the money component of the wage cost.  The orthodox view is that the money 
component has to be flexible (that is, reducible) in order for firms to remain competitive.   
Proponents of wage system flexibility oppose minimum wage regulations and collective 
bargaining, arguing that they undermine flexibility.19  As firms contract out employment, 
they transfer the benefit component of wages down the chain.  Another another pillar of 
the market reform architecture is a reduction in government social spending, so not only 
are workers’ wages decreasing in real terms but their social wage (state expenditure on 
services such as health and education) is decreasing too.   
The third aspect of labour flexibility is “labour cost flexibility” which focuses on the 
non-wage component of labour, such as training costs, and protection costs imposed by 
legislation (such as unemployment insurance and compensation for injuries at work, 
which involve administrative costs) and supervision costs.20 “Globalisation and pursuit 
of labour flexibility have produced extensive debate on how to reduce such costs and on 
their effects”,21 and have resulted in diverse forms of “non-standard” labour, such as 
casual labour, temporary labour and agency labour, as a means to reduce some of these 
costs.  These new employment relations have “informalised” workers in that their rights 
to security, protection, benefits and to organise have been eroded.    
The fourth aspect of labour flexibility is “numerical flexibility”, which enables firms 
to hire when the market demand is high and fire when demand is low.22  Thus, 
uncertainty and risk concomitant with fluctuating demand is no longer carried by firms 
but by workers, whether casual, part-time or so-called independent contractors.   
The aggregate implications of the shift in employment relations for unskilled or 
semi-skilled people is that the risk, benefits and protection previously carried by large 
enterprises has shifted either to workers themselves, or to firms further down the chain.  
In developing countries characterised by weak or unenforced regulatory regimes and 
                                                 
19 Standing, G (1999). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid at 100. 
22 Standing, G (1999). 
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which are subject to the GFIs’ policy prescriptions, this insecurity is concomitant with 
“poverty, precariousness and persistent informality”23.   
2.2 The implications of product market de-regulation and labour market 
flexibility: discourses in labour law 
Labour law scholars are concerned with the implications of of de-regulation and 
flexibility for “labour” (workers who have “standard” employment contracts) and for 
the future of collective bargaining, given that increasingly outsourcing, subcontracting 
and casualisation of labour mean that a significant number of workers are 
informalised.24 They are also concerned for the future of labour law itself.25    
Canadian labour law scholar Harry Arthurs26 argues that the “constitutive 
narrative” of labour law as “the law of collective labour relations” has meant that 
collective bargaining at the level of the workplace has been privileged by labour lawyers 
as the dominant scholastic enterprise over other legal sub-fields such as workers’ 
compensation, health and safety, and pension law, which affect “workers’ rights, wealth, 
power, and dignity no less than collective labor law”.27  Moreover, labour law’s limited 
purview has meant that it has failed to take into account that market forces, and a 
state’s trade and monetary policies as well as social welfare and educational policies are 
more likely to be the key determinants of whether labour enjoys decent labour 
standards, than labour legislation or collective bargaining.  The worldwide decline in 
union membership, argues Arthurs, means that the law of collective bargaining 
relations is increasingly irrelevant to workers, laying labour law open to the charge that 
it is increasingly “politically irrelevant and intellectually ossified”.28  He is joined by 
Fischl29 in arguing for a new “constitutive narrative” for labour law.    
Some of these debates are echoed by South African labour scholars.  Benjamin 
argues:  
                                                 
23 Chen, M “Re-thinking the informal economy: From enterprise characteristics to employment relations”  
in Kudva & Beneria Rethinking informalisation (2005) and Beneria, L “Shifting the risk” International 
Journal of Politics, Culture and Society (2001). 
24 See Theron J “Prisoners of a paradigm” IDLL Working Paper (2011) where he argues that the 
outsourcing of functions that previously were considered part of manufacturing, such as industrial 
cleaning and driving, has meant that employees who were previously classified as part of the 
manufacturing sector are now classified as part of the services or transport sector. This has adverse 
implications for collective bargaining, he argues, in that collective bargaining takes place sectorally and 
organising takes place at the workplace. Thus workers in the same workplace, previously represented by 
the same union, now fall under different sectors. 
25 Arthurs H “Labour Law after Labour” Osgoode CLPE Research Paper (2011). 
26 Arthurs was elected a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy in 2003 in recognition of his 
international standing as a labour law scholar.   
27 Arthurs (2001) at 17. 
28 Estlund in Arthurs (2001) at 17. 
29 Fischl M “Running the government like a business” (2011).  
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“The starting point of many of the new theoretical constructs that have been developed to 
‘re‐invent’ labour law has been the attempt to identify a defining principle that is not 
confined to the conventional contract of employment.”30  
South African labour law scholars are engaging with how to extend labour rights and 
protections to informal workers,31 for example by redefining the concept of 
“workplace”,32 and by trying to create legal space to support activists’ attempts to 
mobilise informal workers for collective bargaining. Particular attention has been paid 
to exploring innovative ways to extend social protection to informal workers.33    
While legal discourse on the informal labour market acknowledges that 
casualisation and externalisation (in the form of subcontracting and outsourcing) are 
not the only drivers of informality,34 the phenomena of externalisation and 
casualisation nevertheless tend to frame the debate.   In South Africa, informality is not 
only a result of the shift in employment relations but is also a historical legacy of 
apartheid. The perpetuation of informality is owing, in part, to least three forms of 
structural inequality inherited from the past: spatial inequality, educational inequality 
and the unequal structure of the economy.35    
Altman36 argues that industrial policy during the apartheid era sought to create two 
separate economies – an urban economy driven by capital-intensive growth strategies 
drawing on skilled white labour, and a rural economy which was to absorb “lower 
skilled black labour”. This vision of two economies was enabled by a series of racist laws 
that controlled the mobility of black South Africans, both physically and within the 
economy. 
Three pieces of legislation, known as “influx control” laws,37 restricted the movement 
of black people by establishing criteria in terms of which black people qualified to live in 
an urban area (so-called “section 10 rights”). Black people who did not qualify for a 
permit were not permitted into an urban area for longer than 72 hours. The influx 
control laws were repealed by the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986. 
                                                 
30 Benjamin P “Informal work and labour rights in South Africa” DPRU Conference Paper (2008a) at 11 
31  See Le Roux, R “The world of work: forms of engagement in South Africa” IDLL monograph (2009) and 
Benjamin, P “Informal work and labour rights in South Africa” (2008) 29 ILJ 1579 (2008b). 
32 See Theron (2011). 
33 See Kalula, E,  Okoafor, N & Bamu,P “Towards an effective regulatory framework for labour rights and 
social protection in Southern Africa” in Banik The legal empowerment agenda: poverty, labour and the 
informal economy in Africa (2011); Thompson C “The changing nature of employment” (2003) 24 ILJ 
1793; and Benjamin, P (2008b).  
34 Le Roux (2009). 
35 Philip K “Inequality and economic marginalisation: how the structure of the economy impacts on 
opportunities on the margins” LDD (2010).  
36 Altman M “Formal-informal economy linkages” (2008). 
37 The Native (Black) Urban Areas Act 21 of 1923, The Black (Natives) Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952 
and the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1954. 
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The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 prohibited black Africans from living in areas that 
were not zoned as black areas unless they had a reference (“pass”) book. They were also 
prohibited from owning a home-based business or from acquiring immovable property. 
One of the cornerstones of apartheid was differentiated education for different 
population groups. An education curriculum was designed to educate black Africans for 
manual labour. The Bantu Education Act 43 of 1953 was promulgated to give effect to 
this racist ideology. 
The apartheid government’s systematic exclusion of black people from participating 
in the “formal” economy means that informality and race are inextricably linked in 
South Africa. While racist laws have been repealed, the historical legacy of apartheid is 
that the majority of poor, unemployed people are still black and are still excluded from 
participating in the highly sophisticated, capital intensive formal economy other than as 
consumers, whether for household or micro-enterprise consumption.38   
The focus on “reducing the level of informality of inadequately protected workers”39 
by regulatory governance, then, risks conflating the two processes – informalisation 
because of a shift in labour relations and informalisation because of structural 
exclusion.40   This conflation means that the very arguments that are aimed at 
redressing erosion of rights of certain workers are likely to result in the livelihoods of 
others, who are only able to sell their products to formal markets through 
intermediaries, becoming more precarious.  These arguments are expanded on in the 
next section.   
3. INTERMEDIARIES’ ROLE  IN FACILITATING PARTICIPATION OF POOR 
PRODUCERS IN SUPPLY CHAINS    
In 2010 the author was commissioned by the Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies 
(TIPs) to analyse the role of intermediaries in facilitating the participation of 
marginalised producers in craft and agri-business supply chains.41   
The objective of the study was to understand the legal and institutional nature of 
the relationship between intermediaries and producers and to explore the implications 
                                                 
38 See Philip (2010) for a discussion on structural exclusion of poor producers and retailers. The article 
refers to spatial and educational drivers and includes a detailed discussion on the structure of the South 
African economy, which encourages the structural exclusion of micro businesses. See also Altman (2008). 
39 Benjamin, P (2008b) at 1601. 
40
 The term “informal sector” was coined in 1973 by Keith Hart and describes the informal sector as 
businesses characterised by seven specific traits, including: low barriers to entry, small-scale, labour 
intensive, family-owned, reliant on skills acquired outside of formal schooling, and operating in 
unregulated and competitive markets. More recently the term “informal economy” has gained currency, 
which has broader connotations. It incorporates all activities that are not recorded by formal labour 
market data, not only informal businesses. Thus it includes street traders, home-based businesses, casual 
and contract workers, as well as many domestic workers and farm workers.  See Standing (1999) and 
Chen (2005). 
41
 Von Broembsen M (2011). 
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for producers with respect to ownership, profit share, wages and working conditions 
(and, more specifically, security, benefits and protection).  The study drew on 23 semi-
structured interviews with intermediaries, primarily in the craft and agri-business 
sectors, and with senior managers or directors of two retail giants, namely Pick ’n Pay 
and Woolworths.  Four categories of intermediaries were interviewed: 
 Non-profit organisations (NPOs) active in the small business sector that mediate for 
producers to access markets or that act as a membership body for independent 
businesses or producers to market products or purchase raw materials as a 
collective.   
 NPOs active in social welfare sectors such as literacy promotion or HIV-Aids 
education and treatment. Where it has been realised that that interventions are 
limited if the beneficiary community has no access to income; the NPO establishes 
itself as an intermediary that designs products, trains beneficiaries to make 
products, and sells products to local and overseas markets, often very successfully.   
  For-profit hybrids, which are for-profit entities (such as companies or, most 
commonly, close corporations (CCs)) that have as their primary objective a social 
outcome such as the alleviation of poverty, the empowerment of women, or simply 
contributing to livelihoods by facilitating the participation of marginalised people 
(usually women) in value chains. In most cases, the member (of the CC) or the main 
shareholder does not draw a salary for years and any salary now drawn is modest.  
 Not-for-profit hybrids that comprise more than one entity, one being a for-profit 
entity and the other(s) not-for-profit: for example, an NPO, Afrique du Sud 
Bidonvilles (ASB) assists women to establish co-operatives and provides embedded 
services such as training, pre-cut fabric and a distribution system for the creation of 
biodegradable bags, cosmetic packaging, fashion and decor.  It has also registered a 
for-profit CC with one member. The CC markets these goods to Pick ’n Pay and 
overseas retailers, and has recently opened a store in an upmarket retail centre.  
Categories three and four illustrate that the lines between for-profit and not-for-profit 
are blurred, making it difficult to determine whether an organisation is motivated by 
social outcomes or not.42  Arguably, the legal form of an intermediary is less important 
than whether or not the contract, usually verbal, between the intermediary and the 
producers/users reflects a progressive realisation of decent work for the producers and 
users.  
Some intermediaries simply facilitate producers’ participation in a supply chain.  
They source contracts, then design items and train producers to make them (either at 
their homes or at the intermediary’s premises), provide the raw materials for the 
producer, buy the item from the producer and sell it to the retailer.  Others shift the 
distribution of value in the value chains by reducing their members’ transaction costs. 
                                                 
42 Peredo, A & Mclean, M “Social entrepreneurship” Journal of World Business (2006). 
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For example, by buying inputs collectively for its members an intermediary is able to 
negotiate discounts from wholesalers and negotiate for goods to be distributed to 
individual businesses by the wholesalers.  Some intermediaries fulfil both functions.  
Intermediaries that provide access only are often businesses themselves and thus may 
compete with their producers if they are also providing the market with goods.  Others 
that provide access and re-distribute value (whether by providing services that enhance 
the users’ products or by reducing their transaction costs) generally do not compete 
with their users in the supply chain and may not form part of the supply chain at all.   
A number of interesting findings emerged from the interviews with intermediaries 
and retailers. While the data set is small, the relationship between producers and 
intermediaries is reflective of practices in the broader craft sector. 
1. Marginalised producers, who are mostly women, are unable to participate in supply 
chains without intermediaries.  These producers may be functionally illiterate, have 
a poor command of English, have no formal sector experience and limited numeracy, 
and would be unable to manage the complex communications and networking 
necessary to sell products to the formal economy.43 They are unable to do this 
because they lack the skill set necessary to manage the negotiation process, the 
necessary resources (such as transport) and capabilities (such as design expertise44 
or the ability to manage bulk orders).  This finding is echoed in several empirical 
studies in the craft sector.45  
2. Most producers (in the study) are not independent contractors in that they generally 
produce only for the intermediary, using the intermediary’s designs and raw 
materials.   They are paid by the pieceeal for every product made and earn between 
R 1 000 and R 2 000 per month.   
3. Intermediaries access global supply chains on behalf of producers.  For example, 
producers make bags and lanyards for international conferences and export craft 
items.  They also supply products to South African retailers which are incentivised to 
procure products from intermediaries in order to earn B-BBEE scorecard points.   
4. Intermediaries for the most part appear to be contravening employment laws. On 
the face of it, producers may qualify as employees in terms of section 200A of the 
LRA (discussed below). Yet producers, most of whom work at the premises of the 
intermediary and use the intermediary’s raw materials and tools, are paid by the 
piece. They are not entitled to any form of paid leave (such as annual, sick or 
compassionate leave) or any benefits. Intermediaries also generally do not deduct 
                                                 
43 There are structural reasons for these limitations on their capacities, not least the historical legacy of 
apartheid education and exclusion of black people from labour markets, except as unskilled labour.  
44 Designers are “typically highly trained individuals with knowledge and access to sophisticated and fast-
moving/changing markets. The designer is thus more able than the ‘maker’ to intervene in the craft 
production process and innovate, re-invent or re-create products that satisfy First World customers” (Elk 
E “Accessing Markets from the Margins” Report for TIPS (2010) at 5).  
45 See Elk (2010) and Hay, D, McKenzie, M & Thompson, C Bankable craft: putting money into people’s 
pockets (2010). 
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unemployment insurance contributions or contribute in terms of the Compensation 
for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993. 
In an attempt to provide benefits and protection to “non-standard” or “atypical” 
work spawned by outsourcing, sub-contracting and casualisation of employment, 
the LRA was amended in 2002 to broaden the scope of “employee”.  Additional 
amendments are currently under discussion “to ensure decent work by regulating 
sub-contracting, contract work and outsourcing”.  Section 200A of the LRA creates a 
rebuttable presumption46 that someone is an employee if they earn less than a 
minimum amount stipulated in the BCEA,47 if they work for more than 24 hours a 
month and if just one of seven further factors is present, including whether the 
person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or 
renders services, whether the person is provided with tools of trade or work 
equipment by the other person,  and whether the person only works for or renders 
services to one person.48 Further amendments are currently under discussion “to 
ensure decent work by regulating subcontracting, contract work and outsourcing”.   
Some producers have other sources of income,49 but most depend on the work 
generated by intermediaries for their livelihood and are reliant on the 
intermediaries to finance the raw materials and tools, such as sewing machines and 
paper-making machines. The study suggests that intermediaries would have 
difficulty in rebutting the presumption that producers are in fact employees.  If 
intermediaries fail to discharge the onus and producers thus qualify as employees 
under section 200A, that would trigger employment rights and protections found in 
the BCEA and other employment laws.   
5. Few of the intermediaries interviewed could absorb the financial implications of 
compliance with employment laws50.  Two scenarios then seem likely. In the first 
scenario, intermediaries would restructure their work relations to avoid the seven 
presumptions applying to their relationship with producers. The implications for 
producers would be two-fold. First, producers would be required to work from 
home and absorb the costs of raw materials and tools, implying a transfer of costs 
down the value chain from intermediaries to producers.  Second, intermediaries 
                                                 
46 As Rawling notes: “Reversing the onus of proof has been identified as a method of maximising the 
effectiveness of legal mechanisms in detecting and resolving failures of compliance”: see Rawling M “A 
generic model of regulating supply chain outsourcing” Anu College of Law Social Science Research Network 
(2007) at 10. 
47 See n 8 above. 
48 NEDLAC’s Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee (GN 1774 of 1 December 2006) summarises the 
differences between employees and independent contractors and provides guidelines on the application 
of the rebuttable presumptions contained in s 200A. 
49 Intermediaries indicated that some producers owned spazas (little retail outlets) or generated income 
from sources other than craft products. 
50 Theron (2011) notes that in the milling sector brokers are also constrained by contractual terms 
between them and the milling corporation, which undermines their ability to comply with employment 
laws.  
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would be likely to choose producers who have other sources of income, such as 
another survivalist business, or they would choose producers that also sell their 
products to other buyers.  Thus the most marginalised producers currently working 
with intermediaries would be the most likely to be disqualified.  These are illiterate 
women, many of whom don’t speak English, many of whom are HIV-positive, and 
who are unlikely to be able to finance the cost of raw materials.    
A second scenario is also likely: given that few craft intermediaries have the 
resources, capacity or administrative infrastructure to bear the legislative burden of 
employing producers, enforcing compliance is likely to result in closure of the 
businesses.   This is likely because in most cases the owner-manager earns little, if 
anything.  Enforcing employment laws in the craft sector is thus likely to have the 
unintended consequence that many businesses and NPOs’ livelihood programmes 
would close, which would undermine producers’ livelihoods.    
These findings are reflective of the intermediary/producer relationship in the craft 
sector, but it is suggested that in many cases they would apply to the agri-business 
supply chains. Many of the new agri-businesses I interviewed were able to access 
contracts with retailers because of B-BBEE scorecard pressure on the retailers.  But the 
terms of their inclusion are adverse.  One interviewee spoke of how the price was 
agreed with the retailer’s business development officer but unilaterally revised by the 
buyer.  The buyer also decided on the percentage the supplier would pay as a 
distribution fee, an advertising fee and the credit terms.  Others told of how buyers 
drove such hard bargains that the cost per item did not cover the costs of producing 
samples or packing.  The result was that they simply could not afford to employ people 
other than on a piecemeal or casual basis.   
These findings suggest that shoe-horning the work relationship into either a binary 
or a triangular relationship in order to establish labour rights fails to capture the 
complexity of how marginalised producers participate in value chains and to assimilate 
the power dynamics between lead firms and intermediaries.  In Benjamin’s words, it 
still uses the employment relationship as the “defining principle”.    
This article now turns to a different analytical tool: value chain analysis (VCA), 
which shifts the focus from intra-firm governance to inter-firm governance.  While some 
labour lawyers have mentioned the value chain as an analytical lens, there is little legal 
scholarship that describes VCA in any detail or analyses how it could be used by 
lawyers, besides suggesting that it would involve labour rights for all workers in a 
supply chain.51  This article seeks, in part,  to establish legitimacy for value chains as an 
alternative analytical lens with the hope that it will contribute to the debate on the re-
envisioning of labour law in South Africa, and specifically of collective organisation.   
                                                 
51  See Benjamin (2008b); Theron (2011) & Rawling (2007). 
 LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT / VOL 16 (2012)  
 
14 | P a g e  
 
 
Ultimately, this article would posit that both inter- and intra- firm governance are 
necessary to realise, progressively, decent work for producers.52   
4. A DIFFERENT LENS: VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS  
The concept of commodity chains was introduced in 1977 by world systems theory 
pioneer, Immanuel Wallerstein.53  It was a largely sociological framework that sought to 
challenge the orthodox understanding of globalisation and economic development and 
their inter-relationships with the geographical expansion of capitalism.54  It was only in 
1994 that scholars, most notably Gereffi, began to develop the commodity chains 
framework by drawing on perspectives offered by international business literature.55  
Between 2000 and 2004 academic researchers from different countries and disciplines 
met for a series of workshops to develop a more coherent theoretical framework, given 
the proliferation of literature, academic researchers and disciplinary discourses that 
populated the field. This “consensual” framework became known as “global value 
chains”.56  The term is used generically in this article rather than signalling a particular 
allegiance to global value chains.57   
VCA is a methodological approach to understanding the international division of 
labour that is characteristic of the new global economic order, as well as an analytical 
tool whereby a particular supply or value chain is analysed from the inception of a 
product until its final destination to map the relationships between different actors in 
the chain, the governance structures, the distribution of value added (and extracted) by 
each firm and the distribution of power among firms.   
Global value chain (GVC) proponents advocate the “theory of global value chain 
governance” as “useful for crafting effective policy tools” to facilitate economic 
development, create jobs and alleviate poverty.58  Indeed, development agencies have 
used it to assess how marginalised producers participate in the particular chain, to 
identify market failure in the form of barriers to their participation, and to craft 
                                                 
52 The South African decent work discourse has tended to reflect a binary construct of “non-decent” 
versus “decent” work, with decent work being held up as the requisite standard. The ILO’s articulation 
reflects a different perspective. For the ILO, decent work is not a “standard” but a progressively realisable 
goal. It envisages informal and formal workers along the same continuum, with those at the bottom of the 
continuum suffering the most “decent work deficits” and workers further up the continuum suffering 
fewer deficits. 
53 Bair, J “Global capitalism and commodity chains” Competition and Change (2005). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Gibbon, P, Bair, J & Ponte, S “Governing global value chains” Economy and Society (2008). 
56 Sturgeon, T “From commodity chains to value chains” Industry Studies Association Working Paper 
(2008). 
57 See Coe, M, Dicken, P & Hess, M “Introduction: global production networks” Journal of Economic 
Geography (2008) and Blair (2005) for discussion on the differences between world-systems theory, 
global commodity chains, and production networks.  
58 Gereffi G, Humphrey J & Sturgeon T “The governance of global value chains” Review of International 
Political Economy (2005) 
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strategies to overcome such constraints.59 “Global” is a descriptor for the spatial 
character of value chains – links in the chain are frequently spread over the globe – but, 
it also serves as a reminder that regional and even national supply chains are often 
embedded in global value chains.60 
Proponents of VCA have articulated “value” as representing two facets of chains: on 
the one hand, the processes that create value at each link in the chain and, on the other, 
how this value is distributed in the chain61 – that is, which actors appropriate what 
share of the value created.  The second facet is deeply imbricated within the governance 
structure of the particular chain and the market power of the respective actors.   
“Governance” is a particular focus area for GVC scholarship.  In broad terms, value 
chain governance theory is concerned with analysing the power relationships in chains. 
These relationships “determine how financial, material, and human resources are 
allocated and flow within a chain”.62  Specifically, it refers to three aspects of the 
relationship between firms: (1) who decides which products should be produced, the 
buyer or the producer?  (2) how should products be produced – that is, what are  the 
terms of production, including the industry standards or specifications, environmental 
standards and working conditions that are incorporated into the supply agreement?63 
And (3) how the value that is added should be distributed?    
Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon64 developed a typology of value chains based on 
the interplay of three variables: (1) the complexity of the product specifications; (2) the 
degree of supervision required on the part of the buyer;65 and (3) the competence of 
suppliers.66  Based on these three variables, Gereffi et al identified four different types 
of chains, each of which reflect different modes of governance.   
1. The first category of chains takes the form of a market transaction based on demand 
and supply which is governed by an arm’s length contract.  This type of relationship 
is characteristic of transactions where the products being supplied are basic, 
product specifications are straightforward and the transaction needs little buyer 
input.    
2. The second category, modular value chains, describes transactions where the 
product specifications are a little more complex but are capable of being codified 
                                                 
59 Value chain analysis forms part of a poverty alleviation paradigm known as “Making Markets work for 
the Poor”. 
60 Sturgeon (2008). 
61 Gibbon et al (2008).   
62 Bair (2005). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Gereffi et al (2005). 
65 If product specifications can be codified (that is, reproduced in written form to form part of the supply 
agreement) or if the product specifications are very simple, minimal buyer supervision would be 
required. However, if the product specification is complex and not codifiable, then the buyer would need 
to monitor compliance and provide specification input. 
66 See Bair (2005), Gibbon et al (2008) and Sturgeon (2008).   
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and the suppliers have the necessary capabilities to produce the product with little 
supervision from the buyer.   
3. Relational value chains describe transactions where the product specifications are 
complex and the requisite capabilities on the part of the supplier are sophisticated.  
As the specifications cannot easily be codified, the interaction between the buyer 
and the supplier is frequent but, given the sophisticated capabilities required of the 
supplier, the interaction is one of mutual dependence in that neither can easily 
replace the other.  This relationship “may be regulated through reputation, social 
ties and/or spatial proximity”67.   
4. The fourth type of value chain is a captive value chain, which describes a transaction 
where the product specification is very simple but the capability of the supplier is 
limited.  As a result the buyer monitors production very closely, which fosters a 
relationship of dependency by the supplier on the buyer.    
Sturgeon68 argues that the governance typology enables public and private actors to 
predict which value chain activities are most vulnerable to relocation (and 
consequently, which suppliers [producers] are most vulnerable to loss of their 
livelihood).  He would argue that the relational value chain is least vulnerable to 
relocation, since the transaction costs for both buyer and supplier in finding a new 
supplier/buyer tend to be high.  By contrast, the captive chain is most vulnerable to 
relocation since the supplier has limited competencies, which means barriers to entry 
by competition are low.    
Key to a discussion of governance is an analysis of power relations.  Gereffi et al69 
argue that if one places the typology on a continuum, with market relations on one end 
and captive chains on the other, the power asymmetry becomes more marked.  In other 
words, the power between lead firms and suppliers is most equal in chains governed by 
market relations, and increasingly becomes more asymmetrical in favour of the lead 
firm, culminating in the lead firm holding the most market power in captive chains.   
This conclusion seems to invest “market relations” with a spurious notion of equal 
contractual power.  The author’s study of intermediaries, if analysed in terms of the 
three variables, suggest that the supplier/buyer nexus comprises either market-based 
or modular transactions – that is, the chains that Gereffi et al argue are characterised by 
the most equal power relations. Yet intermediaries’ contractual power is typically 
highly circumscribed.  Given the low barriers to entry, particularly in the craft sector, 
and the resultant degree of competition, intermediaries have little bargaining power 
when it comes to negotiating with a retailer or conference organiser on the price for an 
item of craft or for an agri-business product.  As GVC empirical studies show, the market 
power of the lead firm is often such that it structures the entire value chain and 
                                                 
67 Sturgeon (2008) at 27. 
68 Sturgeon (2008). 
69 Gereffi et al (2005). 
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undermines the autonomy of other firms in the value chain, including that of the 
intermediary70. The intermediary’s lack of autonomy fundamentally impacts on its 
ability to increase wages and extend benefits and protection synonymous with decent 
work.  In addition, it impacts on the bargaining power of the producers for improved 
wages, rights and benefits.71  
Gibbon et al72 have critiqued Gereffi et al’s typology for failing to incorporate the 
effect of “extra-transactional structural constraints such as those emanating from 
dominant regulatory systems” on GVC governance. This article suggests that these 
“structural constraints” are, firstly, not limited to regulatory systems but include formal 
and informal norms, such as corporate governance commitments and consumer 
pressure for ethical trade. In addition, it is argued that a typology of value chains should 
incorporate not only constraints but also incentives, which may be regulatory or 
commercial, and which may drive firm behaviour and potentially redistribute power in 
the chain.  These incentives and limitations, regulatory and informal rules and norms 
constitute different forms of institutions.73   
In the next section the dominant institutions that have  governed the employment 
relationship are outlined. Critical discussion follows on the two dominant modes of 
governance of value chains, namely self-governance and regulatory governance.   The 
section argues that these two modes of governance seldom redistribute value and 
power in value chains.  The article makes a case for exploring the potential of using 
commercial incentives as leverages to redistribute power, and thus value, among firms 
in the value chain.  
5. INSTITUTIONS THAT INFLUENCE THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF VALUE 
CHAINS  
In the decades preceding global market reform and the concomitant flexible labour 
market orthodoxy, the hegemonic reciprocity framework that governed relations of 
production in developed and some developing countries took essentially three forms: 
(1) governance by means of public regulation; (2) self-governance  as unions and 
employer organisations engaged in collective bargaining and reached collective 
agreements; 74 and (3) a hybrid of self-governance and state regulation in that the state 
the State extended certain collective agreements to the industry as a whole and/or to 
non-unionised workers in the sector covered by the collective agreement.75   
                                                 
70 See Navdi (2004); Humphrey & Schmitz (2000); Gereffi et al (2005); Gibbon et al (2008). 
71 Navidi (2004). 
72 Gibbon et al (2008) (n 50 above).   
73 North, D Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1999).  
74 Some authors refer to the enforcement of collective agreements by unions as “regulation from below”. 
See, for example, Theron (2011). 
75 See Bosch et al (2010) for an analysis of the different forms of labour market regulation in six countries.  
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Following the global restructuring of labour markets, these forms of governance are 
increasingly irrelevant to the majority of unskilled or semi-skilled marginalised 
workers. As illustrated above, the terms of self-governance are increasingly determined 
by powerful lead firms.  The challenge is to identify institutional leverages that 
challenge the distribution of power in chains with the goal of progressively realising 
decent work for marginalised producers.   
Activist scholars, such as Marty Chen,76 enjoin labour and commercial lawyers to 
rise to the challenge of extending elements of the internal labour market regime that 
applies between firms and their employees, such as social security, collective bargaining 
and benefits, to the supply chain as a whole. Other scholars, such as Barrientos,77 
underline the need to identify commercial leverages to effect redistribution of income 
and power within value chains.    
In the UK and the USA, high-end consumers increasingly demand ethical trade 
practices. Political pressure from international human rights NGOs and consumer 
groups has persuaded multinational companies to commit to enforcing codes of conduct 
across their value chains.  In other words, such pressure has resulted in the contractual 
terms between buyers and suppliers (even in countries that do not enforce labour 
regulation and are enjoined by the IMF, the WB and WTO to have flexible labour 
regimes), including an obligation by the supplier to adhere to labour rights contained in 
a charter. This takes different forms, such as multinationals incorporating fair labour 
practices into their corporate responsibility codes, adherence to terms incorporated in 
international framework agreements that are negotiated by global union federations 
and individual transnational companies, adherence by multinationals to the United 
Nations’ Global Compact, and voluntary membership by multinationals of NGOs such as 
the Fair Labour Organisation and adherence to its charter of rights.78  In the latter 
instance, NGOs audit suppliers to assess their adherence to the relevant charter and 
publish the results of their audits.   
While voluntary codes improve conditions of work, such as health and safety, 
Barrientos79 argues that the enabling rights – specifically, the right to organise and to 
bargain collectively – seldom feature.  Thus the possibility of workers contesting the 
distribution of value, or of redistributing bargaining power, is excluded.   In addition, 
adherence to the code is voluntary and usually only adopted by firms that sell to high-
end consumers who are concerned with the ethics of how their purchases are sourced.  
Finally, the code places additional demands on suppliers, with the lead firm often not 
carrying any costs, while extracting additional value or rent.80 Value may be added to 
the product as it is “ethically sourced” or is certified as a “fair trade” item, which is 
                                                 
76 Chen (2005). 
77 Barrientos  (2007) 
78 Ibid, and Navdi (2004). 
79 Barrientos (2007). 
80 Ibid. 
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reflected in a higher price for the merchandise, but this additional value is appropriated 
by the lead firm.81 Thus the codes improve working conditions but fail to have re-
distributory effects.    
Both self-governance (whereby lead firms sign charters and agree with suppliers to 
adhere to labour standards) and regulatory responses fail to take into account the 
market power of the lead firm and its propensity to extract as much value as possible.  
Thus pressure to re-distribute value in favour of producers, when imposed on the 
supplier or intermediary only, is somewhat misplaced. While the intermediary must 
rightly take responsibility for workplace conditions if the work is performed on its 
premises, it seems unreasonable in the face of skewed power relations to expect the 
supplier intermediary alone to bear responsibility for other aspects of decent work, 
namely adequate remuneration, social protection, benefits and managing risk (of 
fluctuating demand).    
The question is whether there is a mode of governance of the supply chain that is 
potentially more likely to redistribute bargaining power from the lead firm to firms 
further down the chain? The next section explores the redistributory potential of 
incentives and focuses on a particular South African labour (and product) market 
institution, namely B-BBEE.   
6. THE REDISTRIBUTIVE POTENTIAL OF B-BBEE 
Amartya Sen82 posits that the realisation of labour rights relies on supportive 
institutions and that both the rights and institutions need to be embedded within “a 
societal commitment to work for appropriate functioning of social, political and 
economic arrangements to facilitate widely recognised rights”,83 which underlines the 
fact that the realisation of rights and the efficacy of institutions depend on the nature of 
the political economy.84   
South Africa’s Constitution, a product of protracted struggle, negotiation and 
settlement – “a constitutional revolution”85 – constitutes in one senser a social compact 
to transform South Africa from its racist past into a society underpinned by socio-
democratic ideals of equality, distribution and redistribution.86  
Recognising that existing, systemic, race-based inequality would be entrenched by a 
procedural equality clause, section 9(2) of the Constitution states that “to promote the 
                                                 
81 See Peredo & Mclean (2006)  for a discussion on social enterprises and the predisposition of 
multinationals to market the fact that goods were sourced ethically or from disadvantaged communities 
as “cause branding”. 
82 Sen, A “Work and Rights” International Labour Review (2000). 
83 Ibid at 15. 
84 Authurs (2011) makes the point that “labour law ... takes its purpose, form, and content from the larger 
political economy from which is originates and operates”.  
85 Currie, I & De Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) at 2. 
86 Liebenberg, S Socio-Economic Rights: adjudication under a transformative Constitution (2010). 
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achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be 
taken”.   
The Constitution thus recognises that historical discrimination has structurally 
advantaged white citizens and that, unless the State uses legislative and other means to 
shift the embedded power relations, black citizens will not have the capabilities 
necessary to access and use opportunities in order to fully enjoy “all rights and 
freedoms” reflective of substantive equality. Section 9(2) thus explicitly endorses 
legislative and policy measures that target particular persons or categories of persons 
for special measures in order to level the playing field and facilitate substantive 
equality.  The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (“B-BBEE 
Act”) and regulations, in the form of codes of conduct, represent such measures.    
The objective of the B-BBEE Act is to facilitate participation of black citizens in the 
economy.  The B-BBEE Act and codes of conduct outline different indices by which 
companies are measured in respect of the extent to which they facilitate participation 
by black citizens in the market.   The B-BBEE project targets compliance in seven areas, 
including equity participation by black shareholders, management participation by 
black employees, economic participation by black-owned enterprises by means of 
preferential procurement, and assistance to black enterprise development.  Indices that 
measure compliance include the percentage of a company’s black shareholders; the 
percentage of black managers and directors; the percentage of turnover spent on 
enterprise development; and the percentage of goods and services it has procured from 
black- owned enterprises. Results of listed companies’ B-BBEE scorecards are published 
per industry and government privileges those corporations that have high scorecard 
points in any commercial transaction with the state, ranging from the allocation of 
fishing quotas to procurement of its goods and services.  This article is concerned with 
retailers’ procurement from black-owned businesses.   
Section 2 of the B-BBEE Act outlines the objectives of the Act and refers to 
promoting economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation of 
black people in the economy.  The references to “effective participation”, “equitable 
income distribution” and “meaningful participation” in the Act give expression to “the 
constitutional right to equality” and signify that the participation envisaged is not 
simply procedural, but substantive.   
Despite legislative promotion of “effective” and “meaningful” participation and of 
“equitable redistribution of income”, the state’s B-BBEE Verification Manual promotes 
procurement compliance audits that measure formal rather than substantial 
compliance.  Verification agencies are required to assess the total firm expenditure on 
preferential procurement, not whether participation by black-suppliers is “effective” or 
“meaningful” or whether income is equitably redistributed.  Firms score B-BBEE points 
if they contract with black-owned enterprises irrespective of the terms of the 
procurement contract.  It thus incentivises participation of black-owned enterprises in 
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value chains but fails to address the exploitative terms that powerful lead firms can 
impose.   
This section argues for B-BBEE to be employed to promote a broader range of social 
goals than simply participation.   As argued above, voluntary codes rely on lead firms to 
enforce better working conditions by intermediaries or suppliers – that is, the cost of 
providing better wages and working conditions are carried by the intermediary without 
the lead firm transferring any value down to the intermediary or supplier.  It is 
submitted that B-BBEE scorecard points should be used as leverage to shift value down 
the chain – that is, lead firms should contribute to improved working conditions for 
producers.   
The two giant retailers interviewed have both restructured their businesses to 
identify, mentor and procure from black-owned businesses.  Some of these businesses 
are fully black-owned, others are partially black-owned in that employees are given 
some equity and still others are co-operatives, non-profit organisations or trusts that 
benefit historically disadvantaged communities. The majority of these “businesses” 
employ unskilled workers, mostly as casual labour.  The products are predominantly 
craft, textile, or agri-products such as olive oil, jam, milk, fruit juice and wine.  While 
there is a genuine (commercially-induced) commitment on the part of retailers to 
procure from black-owned businesses,87 and suppliers are audited by the retailers to 
ensure good working conditions, the value of the contract depends on the bargaining 
power of the “black-owned company”.  Often a verbal agreement is negotiated and 
concluded by the lead firm’s business development officer (or even a “transformation 
director”), but is then unilaterally renegotiated by the buyer, as outlined earlier, on 
terms adverse to the supplier and thus to the producers or employees.  
As previously argued, the lead firm (in this case the retailer) is extracting 
considerable value from producers – more than just their labour or even the value of the 
products. First, it can leverage marketing value from the fact that the product is sourced 
“from the community”, termed “cause branding”.  Second, if the producers are organised 
as a co-operative (even if managed by an intermediary) or if they own shares (even as 
minority shareholders with no control over the business), the South African lead firm 
scores B-BBEE points for procuring from black-owned businesses.   
As lead firms are not just buying products, but also buying B-BBEE scorecard 
points, there is an argument that they should bear some of the cost of realising decent 
work for the value that they extract from the producers via intermediaries.  The B-BBEE 
scorecard could thus be used as leverage to re-distribute value in the value chain.  
There is precedent for claiming recognition of the value of B-BBEE scorecard points 
in the form of monetary compensation in the commercial sector.  For example, a South 
African company listed on the stock exchange (“A”) had three large shareholders.  One 
                                                 
87 Retailers intimated that while they enjoy few opportunities to contract with the state, their B-BBEE 
scorecard reflects a commitment to transformation which indirectly influences their market share. 
 LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT / VOL 16 (2012)  
 
22 | P a g e  
 
 
shareholder (“B”) had recently completed a black economic empowerment transaction 
in terms of which a percentage of its shares was acquired by a black-owned entity.  At a 
board meeting of A, the directors representing B argued that B should be compensated 
because its newly acquired empowerment credentials simultaneously enhanced A’s 
empowerment credentials, which would translate into quantifiable benefits for A.88   
The mechanics of how B-BBEE scorecard points could be used to incentivise value 
re-distribution invite consideration of several options. One argument is for the state to 
amend the B-BBEE Verification Manual to the effect that accreditation agencies are 
required to audit the terms of B-BBEE contracts.  In other words, the audit should 
include an audit of the substance of the contract that gives effect to “effective 
participation”, “equitable income distribution” and “meaningful participation”, however 
these terms are defined. Assuming contracts are audited, the question arises whether 
individual producers should benefit directly, or whether employers should pay 
contributions to a social protection fund to which employees belong. Such a fund could 
serve as a platform for political voice to represent its members not only as workers but 
as citizens. 89 
Since producers participate in the economy largely through intermediaries, and 
given the challenges of organising in the informal economy,90 consideration should be 
given to organising intermediaries.  Intermediaries interviewed supported the idea of a 
membership body of craft intermediaries that would offer shared services, undertake 
policy research and advocate for and represent the interests of intermediaries (and, this 
article would argue, also for producers). For example, it could address the need for 
bridging finance with institutional partners and insurance mechanisms to underwrite 
risks inherent in global value chain participation where transactions involve large 
numbers both in terms of money and products. It is submitted that membership in an 
intermediary body should be subject to a charter that prescribes the criteria for 
membership and which would focus on progressive realisation of decent work for 
producers. A tribunal or internal grievance procedure would have to exist for producers 
to be able to blow the whistle if members failed to comply with any terms.  These are 
broad suggestions that would have to be worked out in consultation with key 
stakeholders in the sector.  
                                                 
88 Conversation with an attorney who represented “A” in July 2011 (given attorney-client confidentiality, 
the identity of the firms cannot be disclosed). While this is just one example, it does illustrate that the 
notion of B-BBEE points having commercial value attributed to them is not a far-fetched idea. 
89 In India SEWA, trade union representing informal women traders, has formed a social protection fund 
and represents its constituency at state and national level committees on social protection. See Chatterjee 
M “Social protection in the changing world of work” in Kudva & Beneria Rethinking informalisation 
(2005). 
90 The ILO's InFocus Programme on Boosting Employment through Small Enterprise Development (SEED) 
commissioned a series of papers on the challenges of organising in the informal economy. See Theron 
(2011). 
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These broad suggestions require further work in consultation with key 
stakeholders in the sector if they are to offer practical answers to progressively 
realising decent work for producers. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Given the structural constraints to participation by producers, caused and sustained by 
national conditions as well as global processes, intermediaries offer one of the few ways 
in which informal producers can participate in formal markets. As such, intermediaries 
make a significant contribution to the livelihoods of those who are otherwise excluded 
from labour markets.  
The challenge is to reach consensus on the scope and content of a reciprocal 
framework for informal producers, the content of normative rights and how they should 
be progressively realised.  While law may codify the consensus, power relations among 
the social actors will determine how the consensus is reached and what the terms of the 
reciprocal framework will be.    
History shows that collective organisation is critical to forging entitlements and 
enforcing rights. In order to shift market power between lead firms and 
intermediaries/producers, and for intermediaries to be able to successfully negotiate 
for a commercial value being attributed to B-BBEE scorecard points (whether the 
attribution of value to B-BBEE points is regulated or not), collective organisation is 
necessary.  Given the challenges of organising in the informal economy, this article 
argues for organising intermediaries rather than producers, and for their being 
organised on a sectoral basis.     
Given the embeddedness of national supply chains within the global economy, 
dialogue among all stakeholders in the supply chains is critical to minimise unforeseen 
consequences of unilateral policy and legislative changes, whether to the B-BBEE Act, 
employment laws or to the tax regime.  
The importance of consensus building between different social actors is well 
established. Bosch et al argue, on the basis of their study of non-standard work in six 
countries, that in the process of consensus building shared equity norms may emerge 
which “can be used to settle distributional issues”.91  Shared norms lead to the stability 
of institutions, which is in everyone’s interests.  In the same vein, the ILO encourages 
social dialogue between stakeholders to reach consensus on the implementation of 
measures to realise decent work.   
Perhaps existing fora, such as the retail committee of the National Empowerment 
Fund, could provide a space for dialogue. However, existing power relations may 
disempower nascent organisations of intermediaries and/or producers.   When parties 
with embedded power create the participative spaces and “ invite” marginalised parties 
                                                 
91  Bosch et al (2010) at 137.  
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into these spaces,  it is very difficult for the invited group to contest the rules of 
engagement.92. The challenge for marginalised groups is to be able to contest and shape 
the nature of spaces into ones that enable them to negotiate and recreate the rules of 
engagement.  Williams advocates for developing “political capabilities” which he defines 
as “the set of navigational skills needed to move through political space and the tools to 
re-shape these spaces”.93  It is in this context that unions and labour lawyers have a 
critical role to play in working with collective groups of intermediaries to develop their 
political capabilities and thereby to realise aspects of decent work for informal 
producers.   
It has been argued that regulatory responses, and in particular orthodox labour law 
lenses, fail to capture the complexity of the relationship between retailers, 
intermediaries and producers. More seriously, by focusing on the responsibilities of the 
intermediaries, the orthodox lens fails to engage with the considerable power of lead 
firms to shape the conditions of labour for producers working for intermediaries.  Value 
chain analysis, it is argued, provides a more appropriate lens.    
The article has argued that commercial leverages potentially have greater 
distributional potential than regulatory mechanisms on their own.  This is not to 
suggest that regulatory mechanisms are not important or that commercial leverages 
should not be codified in regulations.  Rather, it is to suggest that new forms of 
collective organisation are critical to creating new reciprocal frameworks to govern 
these new employment relations, and to enforcing them.   Perhaps government’s role 
should be less about regulating to extend rights or to create new rights for labour and 
more about identifying, creating and supporting institutional arrangements that will re-
distribute bargaining power between capital and contemporary forms of labour.   
While the article addresses itself to the situation in South Africa, it has located the 
discussion within global discourses for two reasons.  First, discourses prevalent in the 
popular press that advocate for a flexible labour regime reflect the hegemonic nature of 
the neo-liberal “market reform agenda” espoused by the GFIs.   As we shape policy to 
create jobs we need to be mindful of the influence of these powerful ideas, the 
distributional consequences of our choices, and the tendency for organised capital to 
pass risk down the value chain and to appropriate value.  Second, while the prevalence 
of atypical, precarious work and the concomitant threat to the “reciprocity framework” 
is a global problem, many activist scholars94 argue that national labour law and 
enforcement of decent work at a national level are critical to forging global labour 
standards.   
 
 
                                                 
92 Gaventa, J “Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis” IDS Bulletin (2006). 
93 Williams, G “Evaluating participatory development” Third World Quarterly (2004). 
94 Chen (2005); Mayer et al (2010). 
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